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Abstract: This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private informa-
tion game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent’s prior
expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the emergence of unique/multiple
equilibria. This condition indicates that unique equilibria are played if player’s public disagree-
ment is substantial. If disagreement is small, equilibrium multiplicity depends on the relative
precisions of private signals and subjective priors. Extensions to environments with public sig-
nals of exogenous and endogenous quality show that prior heterogeneity, unlike heterogeneity
in private information, provides a robust anchor for unique equilibria. Finally, irrespective of
whether priors are common or not, we show that public signals can ensure equilibrium unique-
ness, rather than multiplicity, if they are sufficiently precise.
Keywords: Global Games, Equilibrium Selection, Heterogenous Priors, Thin out
Effect
JEL: D53, D82, D83
1 Introduction
Heterogeneity in private beliefs is the core component of global coordination games. In the orig-
inal two-player games introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Rubinstein (1989),
as well as in the Morris and Shin (1998) extension with a continuum of players, it is a small
perturbation away from common knowledge, which selects unique equilibria. This pivotal role
of private beliefs was put into perspective by Morris and Shin (2000, 2004), Hellwig (2002), and
Metz (2002), who introduce common priors and public signals into the global games model. In
such extended settings, it turns out that the global game structure, and its inductive equilib-
1I thank Martin Hellwig for bringing the literature on global games to my attention. I thank Sophie Bade,
Nataliya Demchenko, Alia Gizatulina, Olga Gorelkina, Dominik Grafenhofer, Carl Christian von Weizs¨ı¿12cker,
and seminar participants in Bonn for helpful and encouraging discussions.
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rium selection mechanism, is distorted. And it depends on the relative precision of public and
private information whether agents can coordinate on multiple equilibria.
Given that the dispersion of private beliefs is pivotal to the global games approach, it
is complementary to study how a relaxation of the common prior assumption, which adds a
new dimension to the dispersion of private beliefs, affects equilibrium outcomes. To address
this question, we study coordination games which are played by a continuum of agents that
differ with regard to (i) private information and (ii) the mean of their prior over an unknown
fundamental that characterizes the game’s payoffs. While the heterogeneity in private signals
is unobservable to players, players will know the distribution of priors. That is, we study how
agents can coordinate on equilibria in environments, where they know that others hold, and act
upon, views that they commonly know to disagree with. The main result shows that if player’s
public disagreement regarding the coordination game’s payoff structure is substantial, then
they play unique equilibria. That is, unique equilibria can be selected through the dispersion
of priors.
We derive our results in two steps. First, we isolate the pure interaction between private
signals and dispersed priors in an environment which abstracts from public signals. Second, we
add three different types of public signals to examine the robustness of our results. In the first
environment, which abstracts from public signals, we find that heterogeneity in beliefs, which
originates from the dispersion of prior expectations µ, contributes to equilibrium uniqueness.
Dispersion in private signals, on the contrary, induces equilibrium multiplicity. In the extended
settings, where we introduce different types of public signals, we find that prior heterogeneity
still unambiguously contributes towards equilibrium uniqueness. The role of private signals,
on the contrary, is ambiguous and depends critically on the specification of the public signal.
The main finding in the second part of the paper is therefore that heterogeneity in priors,
unlike heterogeneity in private information, provides a robust anchor for unique equilibria. Put
differently, we show that heterogeneous priors robustly select unique equilibria in rather diverse
environments. In turn, we compare this finding to the literature where the presence of common
priors induces multiple rather than unique equilibria.
Finally, as a byproduct of our analysis, we find that public signals in themselves, irrespective
of whether priors are heterogenous or common, have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium multi-
plicity: increases in the public signal’s precision can ensure equilibrium uniqueness. This result
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is of interest in comparison with those of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004), Hellwig (2002), Metz
(2002), Angeletos and Werning (2006) who find that increases in the public signal’s precision
unambiguously induce multiple rather than unique equilibria.2
Compared to the literature, we extend the canonic common prior coordination games by
Morris and Shin (2000, 2004) to a setting where agents’ prior distribution’s mean µ, regard-
ing the true state of the world, are normally distributed over the economy’s population. In
the model of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004), equilibrium uniqueness is ensured iff
√
αx
αp
≥ 1√
2pi
;
where αx is the private signal’s precision and αp is the prior’s precision. For the general-
ized game, where subjective prior expectations µ are distributed with variance σµ, we obtain√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ ≥ 1√2pi as an analog condition for equilibrium uniqueness. This formula’s main
strength is that it isolates how prior heterogeneity σµ affects the number of possible equilibria.
In general, the condition shows that incomplete information games where the population of
players is polarized such that there are two large tails have unique equilibria. Or, equivalently,
unique equilibria are ensured if there is only a small group of agents which have “intermedi-
ate” or “moderate” beliefs. Put differently, increases in the priors dispersion, σµ, “thin out”
the group of agents with “moderate” beliefs which can, potentially, coordinate on multiple
equilibria. Technically, equilibrium multiplicity depends on the relative precisions of private
information (αx) and the subjective prior (αp) if the prior’s dispersion is small (σµ <
1√
2pi
).
For sufficiently dispersed priors, (σµ >
1√
2pi
), equilibria are unique, irrespective of the relative
precisions of private signals and priors. The original uniqueness condition for the common prior
economy (
√
αx
αp
≥ 1√
2pi
) obtains as prior dispersion (σµ) vanishes.
In Section 3, we extend the information structure and embed our coordination game into
three different public signal environments. These extensions provide a background to study the
fundamental difference between heterogeneity in priors and private signals. The main finding
in this section is that only heterogeneity in priors selects unique equilibria reliably. On the
contrary, the role of both private and public signals changes from environment to environment.
These findings originate, first of all, from an environment where the public signal reveals the
true state of the game with exogenous quality; secondly, from an environment that may be
seen as a financial markets context, where stock prices aggregate and reveal dispersed private
2There will be two classes of equilibria in this setting, and the public signal’s precision ensures uniqueness
for every given signal realization. However, if the public signal’s precision is sufficiently high, there may be
multiplicity in the public signal’s realization itself.
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information with endogenous quality; and thirdly, from an environment with public signals
that allow agents to observe each other’s actions. Comparison of all three public signal settings
shows that the prior’s dispersion σµ is the only parameter which can ensure unique equilibria in
all environments. The implications of the public and private signals’ precisions, however, vary
from case to case. In particular, increases in the private signal’s precision ensure uniqueness
(multiplicity) when public signals are of exogenous (endogenous) precision.
Recently, Steiner and Stewart (2008), Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), and Mathevet (2012)
have introduced heterogenous priors into global games. Steiner and Stewart (2008), Izmalkov and Yildiz
(2010), and Mathevet (2012) focus, respectively, on learning, rationalizability of strategies, and
applications to mechanism design. Unlike Steiner and Stewart (2008) and Mathevet (2012),
who focus on N-player games, we study games with a continuum of players as in Izmalkov and Yildiz
(2010). Contrary to Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), who focus on the private information limit3 of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), which carries over to these more general games, the present
paper develops a sharp characterization of equilibrium multiplicity at and away from the private
information limit.4 The present paper is therefore the first to derive closed form expressions for
the emergence of multiple equilibria in large games with heterogeneous priors. Moreover, by
means of the public signal environments, it provides a framework to interpret the role of prior
heterogeneity in the global games structure.5
Regarding the heterogeneity in priors, we note that Morris and Shin (1998, 2000, 2004)
embed their common prior incomplete information coordination games in a currency crises,
3In the “private information limit”, the private signal’s precision goes to infinity. A crucial consequence of
this is that the importance of priors for the agent’s decisions vanishes.
4Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010) discuss prior heterogeneity in a game with a continuum of players.
Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), p. 25, focus on the formation of individual threshold strategies and avoid the
“delicate” question of equilibrium multiplicity, which is the focus of the present paper. More precisely,
Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010) study games with heterogenous priors (“sentiments”) and characterize for a family of
coordination games how prior dispersion affects the unique threshold equilibrium which is ensured once private
information becomes sufficiently precise. Due to the focus on the private information limit, it remains an open
question how prior heterogeneity affects the number of equilibria in those cases where private signals are not
arbitrarily precise. This question is the focus of the current paper. Finally, while Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010)
characterize games with general distribution functions, the present characterization of equilibrium uniqueness
and multiplicity, away from the limit where private information is very precise, relies on the afore mentioned
normality assumptions.
5Steiner and Stewart (2008), Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), and Mathevet (2012) abstract from public signals.
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bank-run and debt-run context respectively. In these contexts, our assumption of a prior
distribution µi ∼ N (E[µ], σ2µ), which is known to all agents, may be interpreted as a publicly
observable distribution of exchange rate forecasts or credit ratings. Such a distribution of
conflicting beliefs, may also be seen as consistent with publicly disclosed long and short positions
that large investors take in a firm’s stock or debt. While Morris (1995) and Sethi and Yildiz
(2012), discuss heterogenous priors and their origins in detail, we will take prior heterogeneity
as a given. In turn, we focus purely on the implications that public disagreement has for the
emergence of multiple equilibria in the global games framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce the model. Section
2.2 contains the main result. In Section 3, we reflect on our findings in three distinct public
signal environments. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
To isolate the implications of prior dispersion, we start with a setting that differs only with
regard to the heterogeneity of priors from the canonic framework introduced by Morris and Shin
(2000, 2004).
2.1 Strategies, Payoffs and Information
There is a status quo and a unit measure of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each of these agents
i can choose between two actions ai ∈ {0, 1}. Choosing ai = 1 means to attack the status quo.
Choosing ai = 0 means that the agent does not attack the status quo. An attack on the status
quo is associated with a cost c ∈ (0, 1). If the attack is successful, the status quo is abandoned
and attacking agents receive a net payoff 1− c > 0. If the attack is not successful, an attacking
agent’s net payoff is −c. The payoff for an agent who does not attack is normalized to zero.
The status quo is abandoned if the aggregate size of the attack A :=
∫ 1
0
aidi exceeds the
strength of the status quo θ, i.e., if A > θ. Otherwise, if A < θ, the status quo is maintained
and the attack fails. Regarding the fundamental, θ, each agent i holds a prior belief θ ∼
N (µi, σ2p). In our setting, we assume that the priors, regarding the fundamental θ, are normally
distributed across the population, i.e., µi ∼ N (E[µ], σ2µ). And the distribution of priors is
common knowledge. In addition to the prior, each agent receives a private signal xi = θ+σxξi.
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Where signal noise ξi ∼ N (0, 1) is i.i.d. across the population. We parameterize the information
structure in terms of precisions αx ≡ 1σ2x and αp ≡
1
σ2p
. Agents use their information to calculate
expected utility
E[U(A, θ, c, ai)|µi, xi] = ai(1× P (θ < A|µi, xi)− c). (1)
Where P (θ < A|µi, xi) is the probability that the attack is successful given signal xi and prior
belief µi. Regarding payoffs, (1) reflects that an agent i, who does not attack (ai = 0) receives
a safe payoff of 0, while an agent who does attack (ai = 1) receives 1 − c if the attack is
successful, and −c otherwise. To close the description of agents’ information, we note that the
distributions of xi and µi are commonly known to all players. With the private choice problem
in place, we now characterize equilibrium.
2.2 Equilibrium
As Morris and Shin (1998, 2004), we focus on monotone threshold equilibria. Each threshold
equilibrium will be characterized by a pair ψ∗, θ∗. Where θ∗ separates values θ < θ∗ for
which the status quo is abandoned from values θ > θ∗ where it prevails. The threshold level
ψ∗ ≡ αx
α
x∗ + αp
α
µ∗ summarizes the critical pairs x∗, µ∗, for which agents are just indifferent
between attacking and not attacking.6 The equilibrium pairs, ψ∗, θ∗, are determined by the
simultaneous evaluation of the payoff indifference condition and the critical mass condition.
The payoff indifference condition, PIC, follows directly from the individual choice problem (1).
Taking the threshold level θ∗ as given, we have:78
P (θ ≤ θ∗|x∗, µ∗) = c ⇔ Φ
(√
α(θ∗ − αx
α
x∗ − αp
α
µ∗)
)
= c; α = αx + αp, (2)
where Φ() is the cumulative of the standard normal distribution. The PIC (2) characterizes
those pairs x∗, µ∗ which are such that the agent is indifferent between attacking and not at-
6In the context of the currency crises model of Morris and Shin (1998), attacking agents would sell short
a country’s currency, and the central bank’s reserves θ are either sufficient (θ > A) to defend the peg or not
(θ < A). In another interpretation, agents can run on/sell short a firm’s debt, and if the firm’s financial strength
is insufficient it defaults.
7See Raiffa and Schlaifer (2000), p. 250, for the standard results on prior and posterior distributions of
normally distributed variables which are used throughout the paper.
8Note that we already use the (forthcoming) critical mass condition, (4), which requires that θ∗ ≡ A(ψ∗, θ∗),
and replace A with θ∗ in (1) to obtain (2).
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tacking. To work with Condition (2), we define ψ ≡ αx
α
x+ αp
α
µ such that (2) writes:
P (θ ≤ θ∗|ψ∗) = c ⇔ Φ
(√
α(θ∗ − ψ∗)
)
= c; α = αx + αp. (3)
And agents who receive ψ ≤ ψ∗, which is evidence of a weak fundamental, attack. Agents
who receive ψ > ψ∗ do not attack since they believe in a strong fundamental, which makes a
successful attack unlikely.
The critical mass condition, CMC, takes the cutoff value ψ∗ as given and determines the
threshold θ∗, where the attack is just strong enough to overwhelm the status quo. To calculate
the mass of attacking agents, we note that ψ|θ ∼ N (αx
α
θ + αp
α
E[µ], α−1ψ ) where αψ ≡ α
2
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
and α = αx + αp. The CMC therefore writes:
A(ψ∗, θ∗) ≡ P (ψ < ψ∗|θ∗) = θ∗ ⇔ Φ
(√
αψ(ψ
∗ − αx
α
θ∗ − αp
α
E[µ])
)
= θ∗. (4)
Again, Φ() is the cumulative of the standard normal distribution. Regarding (4), we note that
it implies that there exists only one ψ∗ for every θ∗. Simultaneous evaluation of (3) and (4)
yields threshold equilibria ψ∗, θ∗:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium ψ∗, θ∗ is unique, for all parameter pairs, if and only if√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ ≥ 1√2pi .
Proof. We solve (3) for the threshold level ψ∗ = −Φ−1(c) 1√
α
+ θ∗, and substitute ψ∗ into (4)
to obtain a one-dimensional equation in θ∗:
Φ
(√
αψ
(
− Φ−1(c) 1√
α
+ θ∗ − αx
α
θ∗ − αp
α
E[µ]
))
= θ∗. (5)
The sufficient condition for uniqueness of the threshold θ∗ is therefore:
√
αψ
αp
α
φ
(√
αψ
(
− Φ−1(c) 1√
α
+
αp
α
θ∗ − αp
α
E[µ]
))
≦ 1
⇔√αψαp
α
1√
2pi
e
−
(
√
αψ
(
−Φ−1(c) 1√
α
+
αp
α
θ∗−αp
α
E[µ]
))2
1
2
≦ 1. (6)
Finally, we recall that αψ =
α2√
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
and take logarithms to obtain:
ln
( 1√
2pi
1√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ
)
≦
(√
αψ
(
− Φ−1(c) 1√
α
+
αp
α
θ∗ − αp
α
E[µ]
))2 1
2
.
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Accordingly, unique equilibria are ensured once:9
ln
( 1√
2pi
1√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ
)
≤ 0 ⇔
√(√αx
αp
)2
+ σ2µ ≥
1√
2pi
. (7)
In one interpretation, the role of the prior’s dispersion σµ in Condition (7) indicates that
polarized economies, with two large groups (tails) which believe that the status quo is going
to be maintained (abandoned), have unique equilibria. Put differently, increases in the prior’s
dispersion σµ “thin out” the group of agents, around the mean E[µ] who hold “moderate”
beliefs. And it is this group which can potentially coordinate on multiple equilibria. Regarding
the prior’s weight, αp, we find that, for every given prior expectation µ, increases in αp make
actions more predictable. This allows agents to coordinate, as in the common prior economy
of Morris and Shin (2004), which contributes towards equilibrium multiplicity. Comparison of
the two origins of belief heterogeneity indicates that increased dispersion of private signals
contributes towards equilibrium multiplicity, while increases in the dispersion of prior beliefs
µ contributes towards uniqueness. In the next section, we show that the thinning-out effect is
robust to various changes in the informational environment. And it is the only avenue that can
ensure unique equilibria in all three public signal environments that follow.
From a technical perspective, we note that Proposition 1 has two corollaries:
Corollary 1. If the prior µ is sufficiently dispersed, such that σµ >
1√
2pi
, equilibria are unique
irrespective of the relative precision
√
αx
αp
of private signal and prior. And in the case where the
private signal is uninformative, αx = 0, unique (multiple) equilibria exist if σµ > (<)
1√
2pi
.
Corollary 2. The uniqueness condition
√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ ≥ 1√2pi converges smoothly to the unique-
ness condition,
√
αx
αp
≥ 1√
2pi
, of the Morris and Shin (2004) common prior game, as σµ → 0.
3 Public Signals
To reflect on the role of prior heterogeneity, we introduce three different types of public signals
into our baseline setting. Each of these public signals is chosen to isolate particular differences
9That is, if (7) holds, then (6) never holds with equality for real-valued θ∗’s. Put differently, the polynomial
which characterizes those values θ∗, for which (6) holds with equality, has two complex roots.
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between heterogeneity in priors and heterogeneity in private signals. The main finding in this
section is that only heterogeneity in priors selects unique equilibria reliably. That is, if player’s
disagreement, as measured by σµ, is substantial, then they play unique equilibria irrespective
of the particular public signal context. That is, the result from the previous section, i.e., that
prior heterogeneity induces equilibrium uniqueness through the thinning-out effect, is robust
to the introduction of public signals. On the contrary, the role the private signal will change
from environment to environment.
The first public signal, which we introduce into our baseline model from Section 2, is of
exogenous quality. That is, it reveals the true fundamental of the game with exogenous precision
αz. In such an extended setting, we find that the comparative statics of the subjective prior’s
precision αp change: contrary to the baseline setting, where increases in the prior weight always
contribute towards multiplicity, we find that increases in the prior weight can now shift the
modified economy from multiplicity towards uniqueness. In a second step, we endogenize the
quality of the public signal. To do so, we embed our coordination game into a financial markets
context, where a stock price aggregates and reveals dispersed private information. In this
setting, we find that the role of private information, with respect to equilibrium multiplicity,
is reversed. Namely, equilibrium multiplicity is ensured in the limit where private information
becomes arbitrarily precise. On the contrary, the role of prior dispersion is robust to such
changes in the model structure.
In the last Section 3.1, we introduce a public signal which partially reveals the aggregate
attack A. This signal provides an environment where changes in the prior’s dispersion may, for
intermediate values, induce multiplicity rather than uniqueness. However, in the limit where
prior dispersion grows large, it still ensures unique equilibria. Finally, as a byproduct of our
analysis in Section 3.1, we find that public signals in themselves have an ambiguous effect on
equilibrium multiplicity: sufficiently precise public signals can ensure unique threshold equilib-
ria. This finding is of independent interest in comparison with the games of Morris and Shin
(2000, 2004), Hellwig (2002), Metz (2002), Angeletos and Werning (2006), where increases in
the public signal’s precision unambiguously induce multiple rather than unique threshold equi-
libria.
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1) Public Signal with Exogenous Precision The public signal
Z = θ + σzε, ε ∼ N (0, 1), (8)
allows agents to forecast the true state of the fundamental with precision αz =
1
σ2z
. Agents can
therefore use Z, in addition to x and µ, to calculate the probability with which the aggregate
attack overwhelms the status quo. In Appendix A, we show that, if this signal is used as an
additional source of information in the coordination game of Section 2, we have:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium in the public and private information game with heterogenous
priors is unique if√( √αx
αp + αz
)2
+ σ2µ
1
(1 + αz
αp
)2
≥ 1√
2pi
. (9)
In particular, if the prior’s dispersion is large, such that σµ
1
1+αz
αp
> 1√
2pi
, the equilibrium is
unique independently of the private signal’s precision αx.
Compared to the uniqueness condition (7) from the baseline model, we find once again that
the modified condition (9) has two elements. The first,
√
αx
αp+αz
, reflects the trade-off between
private information αx and prior αp, described by Morris and Shin (2000, 2004) in an economy
without public signals, or respectively, the trade-off between private information and public
signals αz which was emphasized by Metz (2002) and Hellwig (2002) in an economy with a
uniform uninformative prior. Regarding this first term, we find that public information and
prior are perfect substitutes, and both contribute to equilibrium multiplicity. The second term
σ2µ
1
(1+αz
αp
)2
, however, shows that increases in the public signal’s precision αz reduce the effect
of the prior’s dispersion, while the prior weight αp increases it. Condition (9) therefore shows
that the public signal’s precision unambiguously contributes towards multiplicity. Increases
in the prior’s weight αp on the contrary have an ambiguous consequences as they shift the
economy towards uniqueness (multiplicity) if σ2µ > (<)
αx
αpαz
. Finally, (9) reflects that equilibria
are unique in the private information limit where αx →∞.
2) Public Signal with Endogenous Precision To highlight the different implications
of prior dispersion and the dispersion of private signals, we discuss an environment where the
global game is embedded in a financial market setting. Following, Atkeson (2000), Angeletos and Werning
(2006), and Hellwig et al. (2006), we introduce a financial market which aggregates dispersed
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private information on the unknown fundamental θ, through its publicly observable stock price,
as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980), and Hellwig (1980).10 In one interpretation, the ex-
tended model may describe a situation, where bond investors use a firm’s stock price to infer its
default probability, which is of importance for a coordination game that concerns a potential
run on the firm’s debt. We show in Appendix B that it is possible to specify the financial
market such that the public stock price signal, Z, partially reveals the true fundamental θ:
Z = θ − γσεσ2xε, ε ∼ N (0, 1). (10)
Thus, the signal’s precision αz =
1
(γσε)2
α2x is an increasing function of the private signal’s
precision αx =
1
σ2x
. That is, the stock price’s informativeness increases once the stock investors’
information becomes more informative. In the current context, it is important that the precision
with which this financial market publicly reveals the true state of the world θ is increasing
faster (in the private signal’s precision) than the private signal’s precision αx itself. To perform
the equilibrium analysis which concerns the coordination game, we recall (9) and note that
αz = αz(αx). This yields
Proposition 3. The equilibrium is unique if√√√√( √αx
αp + αz(αx)
)2
+ σ2µ
1
(1 + αz(αx)
αp
)2
≥ 1√
2pi
, αz :=
1
(γσε)2
α2x. (11)
Multiple equilibria exist in the private information limit where αx → ∞. The equilibrium is
unique in the limit where σµ →∞.
Proof. Follows from (11) with αz(αx) =
1
(γσε)2
α2x.
Proposition 3 establishes that the finding of Angeletos and Werning (2006) carries over to
an economy with heterogenous priors. Namely, if stock prices aggregate private information
rapidly as in (10), then it is precise private information which ensures equilibrium multiplic-
ity. Moreover, as αz(αx) becomes large, it marginalizes the influence of prior heterogeneity
10That is, we assume that agents trade stocks prior to the coordination game. These stocks are traded at
a market price P and pay an unknown amount θ. This market price will, in equilibrium, aggregate dispersed
private information and reveal the true fundamental θ partially. Where the partial revelation is due to aggregate
noise-trader activity, σεε, ε ∼ N (0, 1), on the asset’s supply side.
11
σ2µ
1
(1+αz
αp
)2
. Finally, if private noise becomes large as αx → 0 and thus αz(αx)→ 0, equilibrium
multiplicity depends on prior dispersion, σµ, alone.
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Concerning the different implications of heterogenous priors and heterogenous private sig-
nals, the key insight is that the endogeneity of public information inverts the original findings
of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004), Metz (2002), and Hellwig (2002), where increases in private
information induce equilibrium uniqueness as in (9), where the public signal’s precision is ex-
ogenous. The same is not true for the role of prior dispersion, which is, contrary to the private
signal’s dispersion, robust to the introduction of an endogenous public price signal and unam-
biguously contributes towards equilibrium uniqueness. That is, heterogeneity in priors, unlike
heterogeneity in private information, provides a robust anchor for unique equilibria.
3.1 Observing Other’s Actions
In this section, agents can observe the size of the aggregate attack through a noisy public
signal S = Φ−1(A) + σεε where ε ∼ N (0, 1). While games where agents can observe each
other’s actions were already studied by Minelli and Polemarchakis (2003), the current signal
specification is taken from Dasgupta (2007) and Angeletos and Werning (2006), since it al-
lows to preserve normal distributions. The following discussion of equilibrium uniqueness is
accordingly parallel to that in Angeletos and Werning (2006); and their results obtain as spe-
cial cases where priors are uninformative, i.e., where αp = 0. Compared to the analysis in
Angeletos and Werning (2006) we note that public signals of high precision can ensure unique
threshold equilibria in our specification if priors are informative. That is, the role of the public
signal in Angeletos and Werning (2006), pp. 1733-1734, depends critically on the absence of
an informative prior.12
11This finding naturally differs from Angeletos and Werning (2006), where σµ = 0, such that noisy pri-
vate signals unambiguously induce unique equilibria when public information is endogenous once αx → 0 and
αz(αx)→ 0. Related to this observation, we note that among all parameters, αx, αp, σµ, the prior’s dispersion
σµ is the only parameter which can ensure equilibrium uniqueness regardless of the values of the remaining
parameters.
12More precisely, for a priorless game, Angeletos and Werning (2006) show that threshold equilibria are always
unique, but there may exist multiple equilibria in “strategies”. In the present model, which includes informative
(possibly unique) priors, we show that multiple threshold equilibria may exist. However, if the public signal,
over others’ actions A, is sufficiently precise then threshold equilibria are always unique. The observation
that public signals of high quality can ensure unique rather than multiple threshold equilibria is of interest
12
Compared to the previous two signal environments, signal S carries two types of information.
First, similar to signals (8) and (10), the signal S allows agents to make inference on the true
fundamental θ since A = A(θ, ψ∗). Second, unlike signals (8) and (10), the particular signal
realization S is endogenous in the sense that S is implicitly defined by S = Φ−1(A(θ, ψ∗(S)))+
σεε. And there may exist multiple signal values S for every given pair θ, ε. We examine
these potential sources of multiplicity, namely equilibrium multiplicity in thresholds θ∗, ψ∗ and
equilibrium multiplicity in strategies S, ψ∗(S) in separate steps.
3) EquilibriumMultiplicity in Thresholds In the augmented game, with heterogeneous
priors, where agents observe the aggregate attack through signal S, we have:
S = Φ−1(A) + σεε, ε ∼ N (0, 1) (12)
A ≡ P (ψ ≤ ψ∗(S)|θ∗) = θ∗ (13)
P (θ ≤ θ∗|ψ∗, S) = c. (14)
Evaluation of (12)-(14) yields:
Proposition 4. For every given signal realization S, threshold equilibria θ∗, ψ∗ are unique if
1√
2pi
≤ (αx+αz)
αx
√(√
αx
αp
)2
+ σ2µ where αz =
α2xαψ
σ2εα
2 =
α2x
σ2ε (αx+α
2
pσ
2
µ)
. And equilibria are unique when
priors are either sufficiently dispersed or when the public signal is sufficiently precise.
Proof. See Appendix C
With regard to the role of prior dispersion, Proposition 4 shows that prior dispersion con-
tributes towards equilibrium uniqueness in the generalized setting where agents can observe
each other’s actions.13 The more significant finding, however, is that the public signal’s preci-
sion induces equilibrium uniqueness rather than multiplicity. That is, in the present framework,
we find that the public signal allows agents to coordinate on one particular equilibrium rather
than multiple equilibria as in Morris and Shin (2000, 2004), Metz (2002), Hellwig (2002), and
Angeletos and Werning (2006). Moreover, the comparative statics with regard to the public
in comparison with Morris and Shin (2000, 2004), Metz (2002), and Hellwig (2002), who show that multiple
threshold equilibria emerge once public signals are of high quality.
13Note that increases in the prior’s dispersion reduce the public signal’s precision αz =
α2xαψ
σ2εα
2 =
α2x
σ2ε(αx+α
2
pσ
2
µ)
;
for intermediate values of σµ, it is therefore not necessarily true that increases in σµ contribute towards unique-
ness.
13
signal carry over to the unique prior economy where σµ = 0. Finally, for an uninformative prior
where αp = 0, we find that the uniqueness result of Angeletos and Werning (2006) obtains as
a special case.14
4) Equilibrium Multiplicity in Strategies In this paragraph, we study the uniqueness
of the equilibrium with respect to the signal S. In Appendix C, we show that signal S is,
in equilibrium, equivalent to a signal Z(S) = α
αx
ψ∗(S) − α
αx
1√
αψ
S = θ + αp
αx
E[µ] − σε ααx 1√αψ ε.
And multiple equilibria can emerge in the sense15 that there may exist several signal values S,
and thus several values ψ∗(S), which satisfy Z(S) = Z¯. Concerning this potential source of
equilibrium multiplicity we note
Proposition 5. Equilibria in strategies ψ∗(S) are unique if 1√
2pi
≤
√( √
αx
αp+αz
)2
+
σ2µ
1+αz
αp
, with
αz =
α2x
σ2ε(αx+α
2
pσ
2
µ)
. In the limit, where σµ → ∞ there exists a unique equilibrium. In the limit
where αz →∞, there exist multiple equilibria in strategies.
Proof. See Appendix C
Comparison of propositions 4 and 5 with regard to the prior’s dispersion yields an important
corollary:
Corollary 3. The overall equilibrium is unique in the limit where σµ →∞.
Corollary 3 underscores the main result of the paper, i.e., it confirms that sufficiently dis-
persed priors ensure unique equilibria. The public signal’s precision has a more differentiated
influence on equilibria: it ensures uniqueness in thresholds if it is sufficiently precise, but at the
same time it opens the door to multiple equilibria in strategies.
14In a setting with a uniform uninformative prior, Angeletos and Werning (2006), pp. 1733-1734, prove that
threshold equilibria are always unique irrespective of the precisions αz and αx. To obtain this result, one can
either repeat the calculations in Appendix C with αp = 0. Alternatively, one can observe that the uniqueness
condition in Proposition 4 is always satisfied once a sufficiently small value αp is chosen.
15At this point we do not discuss the conceptual validity of this alternative type/source of equilibrium
multiplicity, which implies that the particular signal S is endogenous, i.e., depends on the ψ∗ chosen.
Angeletos and Werning (2006), p.1730, provide a brief discussion and further references regarding this fun-
damental problem.
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4 Conclusion
We have introduced heterogenous priors into the canonic global games model of Morris and Shin
(2000, 2004), Metz (2002), and Hellwig (2002). The analysis of the baseline model indicates that
heterogeneity in priors, unlike heterogeneity in private signals, makes it more difficult for agents
to coordinate on multiple equilibria. That is, the origins of belief heterogeneity are of crucial
importance to the global games approach: heterogeneity in beliefs, which originates from the
variance σµ in prior expectations, contributes to equilibrium uniqueness. Dispersion in private
signals, on the contrary, induces equilibrium multiplicity. In general, the prior’s dispersion can
ensure unique equilibria as it “thins-out” the group of agents who hold “moderate” beliefs.
That is, it reduces the mass of agents with moderate beliefs, and it is this group which can
potentially coordinate on multiple equilibria. Equivalently, our results indicate that if player’s
disagreement, as measured by σµ, is substantial, then they play unique equilibria.
More precisely, we find that if prior dispersion is small, (σµ <
1√
2pi
), equilibrium multiplicity
depends on the relative precisions of private information (αx) and the subjective prior (αp). If
priors are sufficiently dispersed, (σµ >
1√
2pi
), equilibria are unique irrespective of the relative
weights that players assign to private signals and priors. If prior dispersion (σµ) vanishes, the
original uniqueness condition for the common prior economy (
√
αx
αp
≥ 1√
2pi
) obtains.
To compare the implications of prior dispersion and dispersion in private information, we
have discussed a modified game in which a financial market aggregates private information into a
public price signal. Such a modified environment inverts the original findings of Morris and Shin
(2000, 2004), Metz (2002), and Hellwig (2002): increases in private information now induce equi-
librium multiplicity instead of uniqueness. The same is not true for the role of prior dispersion,
which is robust to such a change in the modelling environment and contributes unambiguously
towards equilibrium uniqueness. Put differently, the extended model indicates that prior dis-
persion, rather than arbitrarily precise private information, anchors unique equilibria reliably.
In general, we found that sufficiently dispersed priors ensure unique equilibria across all three
public signal environments. Regarding these public signals, it turned out that their implications
in themselves varied significantly from case to case: increases in the public signal’s precision
ensure multiple threshold equilibria in the first two environments, where signals only contain
information on the unknown fundamental. The opposite can be true in the third environment,
where public signals allow agents to observe each other’s actions. If such signals are of high
15
quality, they can enable agents to coordinate on one unique threshold equilibrium.
Unlike previous studies, which have introduced heterogenous priors into the global games
framework, we have given explicit conditions in terms of means and variances, which allow to
study equilibrium multiplicity for a large economy at and away from the private information
limit. That is, the present framework facilitates comparative statics in the information structure
itself, which allows to characterize and compare the different implications of belief heterogeneity
which originate from priors and private signals, respectively. Moreover, these comparative
statics are useful in those applications of the global games framework where it is interesting, or
necessary, to study the interaction of private and public information away from the limit where
private signals are infinitely precise.
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A Game with Exogenous Public Information
In this appendix, we derive the uniqueness condition that obtains once we augment our baseline
model of Section 2 with a public signal:
Z = θ + σzε, ε ∼ N (0, 1). (15)
This signal allows agents to improve their forecast of the probability with which the aggregate
attack overwhelms the status quo. The modified payoff indifference condition therefore reads:
P (θ ≤ θ∗|x∗, µ, Z) = c ⇔ Φ
(√
α(θ∗ − αx
α
x∗ − αp
α
µ− αz
α
Z)
)
= c; α = αx + αp + αz,(16)
where Φ() is the cumulative of the standard normal distribution. Again, we define ψ ≡ αx
α
x+αp
α
µ
and rewrite (16) as:
Φ
(√
α(θ∗ − ψ∗ − αz
α
Z)
)
= c; α = αx + αp + αz. (17)
The PIC in (17) locates a critical ψ∗ such that agents attack if ψ > ψ∗ and do not attack if ψ <
ψ∗. To calculate the mass of attacking agents, we note that ψ|θ ∼ N (αx
α
θ+αp
α
E[µ], ( α
2
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
)−1).
Once we define αψ ≡ α2αx+α2pσ2µ , the CMC can be written as:
P (ψ < ψ∗|θ∗) = θ∗ ⇔ Φ
(√
αψ(ψ
∗ − αx
α
θ∗ − αp
α
E[µ])
)
= θ∗. (18)
Substitution of (17) into (18) again yields a one-dimensional equation in the threshold level θ∗:
Φ
(√
αψ(
αz + αp
α
θ∗ − αz
α
Z − αp
α
E[µ]− Φ−1(c) 1√
α
)
)
= θ∗. (19)
Accordingly, equilibria are unique if:16
√
αψ
αz + αp
α
1√
2pi
≦ 1 ⇔
√( √αx
αp + αz
)2
+ σ2µ
1
(1 + αz
αp
)2
≥ 1√
2pi
(20)
which is what we needed to show.
B Financial Market and Information Aggregation
In this appendix, we present a financial market that aggregates and reveals dispersed private
information, on the fundamental θ, through the stock price. For the present purpose, it is
16Recall that αψ ≡ α2αx+α2pσ2µ .
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convenient to pick a special case of the linear CARA-normal noise trader equilibrium discussed
by Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980), Hellwig (1980), and Angeletos and Werning (2006).
Stocks are traded at a market price P and pay an unknown amount θ, which represents the
firm’s fundamental strength. This market price will, in equilibrium, aggregate dispersed private
information and reveal the true fundamental θ partially. Where the partial revelation is due
to aggregate noise-trader activity, σεε, ε ∼ N (0, 1), on the asset’s supply side. To characterize
the market price signal, we proceed in three steps. First, we guess that there exists a linear
price function, P = η1θ+ η2ε+ c. Regarding θ, this function is informationally equivalent to a
signal Z ≡ P−c
η1
= θ + η2
η1
ε, which reveals the true fundamental with precision αz =
η21
η22
. Second,
given this price function, we characterize individual demands based on the information x, µ, Z,
and calculate the market equilibrium. Finally, we determine the ratio
η21
η22
as α2x
1
γ2σ2ε
. That is,
price signal Z indeed carries information αz = α
2
x
1
γ2σ2ε
as claimed in (10) in the main text.
5) Demand Agents choose their optimal demands ki for the asset to maximize expected
CARA utility:
ki = argmax
ki
{E[−e−γ(θ−P )ki |xi, µ, Z]}
= argmax
ki
{γE[(θ − P )ki|xi, µ, Z]− γ
2
2
V ar[(θ − P )ki|xi, µ, Z]}
= argmax
ki
{γ(αx
α
xi +
αp
α
µ+
αz
α
Z − P )ki − γ
2
2
k2i
1
α
}, α = αx + αp + αz
and the individual demand function writes:
kdi =
αx
α
xi +
αp
α
µ+ αz
α
Z − P
α−1γ
. (21)
6) Equilibrium Aggregate supply KS = σεε, is unobservable and distorted by noise-trader
activity ε ∼ N (0, 1). From (21), we find that aggregate demand KD is:
KD =
∫
[0,1]
∫
ki(µ)φ(µ)dµdi =
αx
α
θ + αp
α
E[µ] + αz
α
Z − P
α−1γ
. (22)
Equilibrium requires that:
KD = KS ⇔
αx
α
θ + αp
α
E[µ] + αz
α
Z − P
α−1γ
= σεε. (23)
To close the argument, we now resubstitute Z = P−c
η1
and calculate the ratio η1
η2
. First, we solve
(23) for P to obtain:
P =
αx
α− αz
η1
θ − γσε
α− αz
η1
ε+
αpE[µ]− αz cη1
α− αz
η1
. (24)
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Comparison of (24) with our initial guess, P = η1θ+ η2ε+ c, indicates that η1, η2 must satisfy:
η1 =
αx
α− αz
η1
, η2 = − γσε
α− αz
η1
; α = αx + αp + αz. (25)
We quickly determine η1 =
αx+αz
α
, η2 = − (αx+αz)
√
αz
α
to calculate η1
η2
= −αx 1γσε . At the same
time, it follows from the definition of Z that Z = P−c
η1
= θ+ η2
η1
ε. Hence, agents who observe P ,
and know the model’s coefficients, receive a signal Z = θ − α−1x γσεε, as claimed in (10) in the
main text.
C Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
In this appendix, we start by laying out the equations that describe equilibria. In turn, we
characterize the possible equilibria described in propositions 4 and 5 in two separate paragraphs.
We recall the model from the main text
S = Φ−1(A) + σεε, ε ∼ N (0, 1) (26)
A ≡ P (ψ ≤ ψ∗(S)|θ) = θ (27)
P (θ ≤ θ∗|x, µ, S) = c (28)
To calculate equilibria, we recall that agents act on x = θ + σxξ, with ξ ∼ N (0, 1) and
θ|µ ∼ N (µ, σ2p), where the prior µ is distributed over the population as µ ∼ N (E[µ], σµ).
Moreover, we define ψ ≡ αx
α
x+ αp
α
µ with α = αx + αp + αz. The PIC (28) now writes as:
Φ
(√
α(θ∗ − ψ∗ − αz
α
Z)
)
= c; α = αx + αp + αz. (29)
Again, (29) defines a critical ψ∗(Z) such that agents attack if ψ ≤ ψ∗ and do not attack if ψ >
ψ∗. To calculate the mass of attacking agents, we note that ψ|θ ∼ N (αx
α
θ+αp
α
E[µ], ( α
2
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
)−1).
Once we define αψ ≡ α2αx+α2pσ2µ , the CMC (27) can be written as:
A = P (ψ < ψ∗|θ∗) = θ∗ ⇔ Φ
(√
αψ(ψ
∗ − αx
α
θ∗ − αp
α
E[µ])
)
= θ∗. (30)
Using this expression for the aggregate attack A in condition (30), we can return to the public
signal S in (26) and write:
S =
√
αψ(ψ
∗ − αx
α
θ − αp
α
E[µ]) + σεε. (31)
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Where S in (31) is informationally equivalent to a signal
Z(S) ≡ α
αx
ψ∗(S)− α
αx
1√
αψ
S = θ +
αp
αx
E[µ]− σε α
αx
1√
αψ
ε. (32)
Regarding (32), we note that Z(S) contains two aspects (i) Z is a noisy public signal which
reveals the true state of the economy θ with precision αz =
α2xαψ
σ2εα
2 =
α2x
σ2ε(αx+α
2
pσ
2
µ)
and (ii) the
signal S allows agents to align their strategies ψ∗(S). That is, for every given Z¯, there may be
several S such that Z(S) = Z¯. That is, there is a potential source of equilibrium multiplicity,
concerning S, to which we turn in Paragraph 2) of this appendix. For now, we take S as given
and study the threshold equilibria θ∗(S), ψ∗(S).
7) Proof of Proposition 4: Multiplicity in Thresholds θ∗ For every given signal S,
we rewrite (30) as:
ψ∗ = Φ−1(θ∗)
1√
αψ
+
αx
α
θ∗ +
αp
α
E[µ]. (33)
To obtain an equation in θ∗ only, we substitute Z(S) = α
αx
ψ∗(S)− α
αx
1√
αψ
S and (33) into (29).
Rearranging then yields:
Φ
(√
α(
αp
α
θ∗ − 1√
αψ
αx + αz
αx
Φ−1(θ∗)− (αx + αz)αp
αxα
E[µ] +
αz
αx
1√
αψ
S)
)
= c (34)
To derive the uniqueness condition, which ensures that there exist only one θ∗(S) for every
given signal S, we differentiate (34) with respect to θ∗:17
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1) ≤ (αx + αz)
αx
√(√αx
αp
)2
+ σ2µ, (35)
and hence, threshold equilibria are always unique iff 1√
2pi
≤ (αx+αz)
αx
√(√
αx
αp
)2
+ σ2µ. Otherwise,
if 1√
2pi
≥ (αx+αz)
αx
√(√
αx
αp
)2
+ σ2µ, there may exist up to three threshold equilibria
θ∗1(S), ψ
∗
1(S); θ
∗
2(S), ψ
∗
2(S); θ
∗
3(S), ψ
∗
3(S) for every given signal value S.
8) Proof of Proposition 5: Multiplicity in Strategies ψ∗(S) To preclude multiple
solutions18 S(Z¯) to the equation Z(S) = Z¯, where Z(S) = α
αx
ψ∗(S) − α
αx
1√
αψ
S, it will suffice
17Note that for y = Φ−1(θ∗), we have dθ
∗
dy
= φ(y) and thus dy
dθ∗ =
1
φ(y) =
1
φ(Φ−1(θ∗)) .
18The existence of at least one solution is ensured. It follows from (33) that limS→∞
Φ(θ∗(S))−1
S
and
limS→−∞
Φ(θ∗(S))−1
S
are constants. Rewriting Z(S) = α
αx
ψ∗(S)− α
αx
1√
αψ
S as Z(S) = α
αx
S(ψ
∗(S)
S
− α
αx
1√
αψ
) and
recalling ψ(θ∗(S)) as given in (33) one can show that Z(S) varies with S between ∞ and −∞.
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to show that ∂Z(S)
∂S |(32) =
α
αx
∂ψ∗
∂S
− α
αx
1√
αψ
≤ 0. To calculate the derivative ∂ψ(θ∗(S))
∂S
= ∂ψ
∗
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂S
,
defined by (33) and (34), we differentiate (34) which yields ∂θ
∗
∂S
=
−αz
αx
1√
αψ
αp
α
− 1√
αψ
αx+αz
αx
1
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1)
and
(33), (which is a 1 : 1 mapping between ψ∗ and θ∗), to obtain ∂ψ
∗
∂θ∗ =
1√
αψφ(Φ(θ∗)−1)
+ αx
α
. Hence,
we have
∂Z(S)
∂S
=
α
αx
∂ψ∗
∂S
− α
αx
1√
αψ
=
α
αx
∂ψ∗
∂θ∗
∂θ∗
∂S
− α
αx
1√
αψ
= − α
αx
1√
αψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
( 1√
αψφ(Φ(θ∗)−1)
+
αx
α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−αz
αx
1√
αψ
αp
α
− 1√
αψ
αx+αz
αx
1
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
α
αx
. (36)
Once we recall that αψ ≡ α2αx+α2pσ2µ , rearranging (36) gives:
∂Z(S)
∂S
= −
√
αx + α2pσ
2
µ
αx
+
(√
αx + α2pσ
2
µ + αxφ(Φ(θ
∗)−1)
) −αz
αx
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1)αpαx√
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
− (αx + αz)
=
1
αx
[
−
√
αx + α2pσ
2
µ +
(√
αx + α2pσ
2
µ + αxφ(Φ(θ
∗)−1)
) −αz
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1)αpαx√
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
− (αx + αz)
]
=
1
αx
[
− αx(αp + αz)φ(Φ(θ∗)−1) + αx
√
αx + α2pσ
2
µ
] 1
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1)αpαx√
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
− (αx + αz)
=
[
− (αp + αz)φ(Φ(θ∗)−1) +
√
αx + α2pσ
2
µ
] 1
φ(Φ(θ∗)−1)αpαx√
αx+α2pσ
2
µ
− (αx + αz)
(37)
From (37), and the fact that θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that equilibria in strategies are unique if
1√
2pi
≤
√( √αx
αp + αz
)2
+
σ2µ
1 + αz
αp
, αz =
α2x
σ2ε(αx + α
2
pσ
2
µ)
(38)
and
1√
2pi
≤
√
(αx + αz)2
αxα2p
+
σ2µ(αx + αz)
2
α2x
. (39)
That is, once (38) and (39) hold, we have ∂Z(S)
∂S
< 0, which ensures unique solutions S(Z¯) to
the equation Z(S) = Z¯. Comparison shows that inequality (39) is less restrictive than (38).19
Evaluation of (38) therefore yields:
1. In the limit where σµ →∞, equilibria in strategies are unique.
19
√
αx
(αp+αz)2
+
σ2µ
1+αz
αp
≤
√
(αx+αz)2
αxα2p
+
σ2µ(αx+αz)
2
α2x
follows from the inequalities αx(αp+αz)2 ≤
(αx+αz)
2
αxα2p
and
σ2µ
1+αz
αp
≤ σ
2
µ(αx+αz)
2
α2x
, which are easy to verify.
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2. In the limit20 where αz →∞, there exist multiple equilibria in strategies.
3. Multiple equilibria are ensured in the limit where αx →∞.
4. Finally, in the special case where σ2µ = 0 and αp = 0, condition (38) collapses into the
uniqueness condition
√
2pi ≤
√
αx
αz
, of Angeletos and Werning (2006) pp. 1733-1734, which
is nested in the present framework.
D Alternative Derivation of (7)
This appendix contains a derivation of (7) which “explicitly” accounts for the influence which
the prior’s distribution has on the critical mass condition. Recalling the PIC, we have:
P (θ ≤ θ∗|x∗, µ) = c ⇔ Φ
(√
α(θ∗ − αx
α
x∗ − αp
α
µ)
)
= c; α = αx + αp. (40)
Regarding the CMC, we now account explicitly for the prior’s distribution and write:
A(x∗(µ), θ∗) = P (x ≤ x∗|θ∗) = θ∗ ⇔
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(√
αx
(
x∗(µ)− θ∗
))
φ(µ)dµ = θ∗, (41)
where Φ() represents the cumulative of the standard normal distribution and φ(µ) is the normal
density of the prior. To show that the pairs x∗(µ), θ∗, which solve (40) and (41) are unique if√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ ≥ 1√2pi , we solve (40) for the threshold level x∗ = −Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+ θ∗ α
αx
− αp
αx
µ, and
substitute x∗ into (41) to obtain a one-dimensional equation in θ∗ alone:∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(√
αx
(
− Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+ θ∗
α
αx
− αp
αx
µ− θ∗
))
φ(µ)dµ = θ∗.
The sufficient condition for uniqueness of the threshold θ∗ is therefore:
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e
−
(
√
αx
(
−Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+θ∗
αp
αx
−αp
αx
µ
))2
1
2
φ(µ)dµ ≦ 1. (42)
To obtain the final condition, we recall that µ ∼ N (E[µ], σE[µ]), and use the moment generating
function for the non-central χ2 distribution in Paragraph 1) to rewrite (42), as:
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
1√
1 + (σµ
αp√
αx
)2
e
− 1
2
(
√
αx
(
−Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+θ∗
αp
αx
−αp
αx
E[µ]
))2
1
1+(σµ
αp√
αx
)2 ≤ 1. (43)
Taking logarithms yields the uniqueness condition
√
(
√
αx
αp
)2 + σ2µ ≥ 1√2pi .
20Note that the public signal’s precision is endogenous, i.e., given by αz =
α2x
σ2ε(αx+α
2
pσ
2
µ)
. However, the present
observation is informative in the sense that the public signal’s precision can be varied through σ2ε which is
independent of the other parameters.
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9) Moment Generating Function Regarding (42), we recall our assumption that µ ∼
N (E[µ], σE[µ]). We can therefore define y = −Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+θ∗ αp
αx
−αp
αx
µ, where y ∼ N (−Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+
θ∗ αp
αx
− αp
αx
E[µ], σµ
αp
αx
). If a variable y is normally distributed with mean E[y] and variance σ2y ,
then z2 = y
2
σ2y
is non-centrally χ2 distributed. We can therefore use the moment generating
function for the non-central χ2 distribution (Rao (1965), p. 181):21
E[e−tz
2
] =
1√
1 + 2t
e
−E[z]2t
1+2t , t > 0, (44)
to rewrite (42) as (43). To do so, we set t = 1
2
αxσ
2
y =
1
2
σ2µ
α2p
αx
, and substitute z2 = y
2
σ2y
, with
y = −Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+ θ∗ αp
αx
− αp
αx
µ, into (42), to obtain:22
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−tz
2
φ(µ)dµ =|(44)
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
1√
1 + αxσ2y
e
−E[y]2
σ2y
1
2
αxσ2y
1
1+αxσ
2
y (45)
=
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
1√
1 + (σµ
αp√
αx
)2
e
− 1
2
(
√
αx
(
−Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+θ∗
αp
αx
−αp
αx
E[µ]
))2
1
1+(σµ
αp√
αx
)2
. (46)
Where the final step from (45) to (46) involves cancelling and resubstitution of αxσ
2
y = (σµ
αp√
αx
)2
and E[y] = −Φ−1(c)
√
α
αx
+ θ∗ αp
αx
− αp
αx
E[µ].
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Eetz
2
= 1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
tz2e−
(z−E[z])2
2 dz = 1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
− (1−2t)z
2−2E[z]z+E[z]2
2 dz =
1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
−
(
√
1−2tz−E[z])2−E[z]
2
1−2t +E[z]
2
2 dz = 1√
1−2t
√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
−E[z]
2t
1−2t e−
(
√
1−2tz−E[z])2
2 d
(√
1− 2tz) = 1√
1−2te
−E[z]
2t
1−2t .
22Regarding the equality in (45), we note that
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
−tz2φ(µ)dµ =
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
−tz2 1√
2piσµ
e
− (µ−E[µ])
2
2σ2µ dµ =
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
−tz2 1√
2piσµ
e−
(z−E[z])2
2 σµdz =
αp√
αx
1√
2pi
∫∞
−∞ e
−tz2 1√
2pi
e−
(z−E[z])2
2 dz. It now follows from the steps in footnote 21, equation (44) respec-
tively, that the equality in (45) holds.
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